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U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WANDA LUCILE COFFER, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Case No. 88-0379 CA 
vs. ) 
JOHN E. COFFER, ) Priority 14 b 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) as this is an appeal 
from an Eighth Judicial District Court involving domestic 
relations, specifically, a divorce and property settlement. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a bench trial in a divorce 
proceedings. As the parties were an older couple and had no 
minor children, the only issues before the Court were property 
division and alimony. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Court err in awarding Plaintiff 26.5% of 
Defendants Teamster's pension as marital property? 
2. Was it error to require Defendant to cash-out 
Plaintiff's share of the retirement fund if direct payments to 
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Plaintiff by the Teamster's Pension Fund could not be arranged? 
3. Did the Court err in its award of alimony to Plaintiff, 
specifically in that (a) the award is permanent and does not 
require Plaintiff to become self supporting, and (b) Defendant's 
pension payments will decrease in July, 1989? 
4. Did the Court err in ordering Defendant to maintain 
Plaintiff as beneficiary on an insurance policy on his life in 
the amount of $5,000.00 as part of its alimony award? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Plaintiff/Respondent believes that there are no 
determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or 
rules in this case. 
FACTS 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Coffer were married on June 7, 1970. 
(Transcript, p. 6, Record, p. 180.) 
2. Mrs. Coffer filed for a divorce from Mr. Coffer in 
September, 1987. (Amended Complaint, Record, pp. 50-54.) 
3. Mrs. Coffer did not work outside the home during the 
course of the marriage, except for two (2) years when the parties 
leased a Dude Ranch. Mrs. Coffer worked in the cafe and bar at 
the Dude Ranch. (Transcript, pp. 197-199, Transcript, pp. 23-
25. ) 
4. Mr. Coffer was a member of the Teamster's Union, and 
has participated in their retirement fund from 1958 until he 
retired in 1982. (Transcript, p. 67, Record, p. 24 and 74.) 
5. Mr. Coffer had two (2) heart attacks and was forced to 
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retire early as he was totally disabled. (Transcript, p. 66, 
Record, p. 240.) 
6. The amount of Mr. Coffer's payments from his Teamster's 
Pension was based on the amount of time he worked. (Transcript, 
p. 75, Record, p. 249. Record, p. 74, 75 and 76. Addendum "A", 
"B" and ffCn.) 
7. Mr. Coffer was 63 at the time of the trial on January 
19, 1988. (Transcript, p. 74, Record, p. 248.) 
8. Mrs. Coffer was 57 at the time of trial. (Record, p. 
101. ) 
9. At the time of trial, Mrs. Coffer had obtained 
employment as a waitress in the Hanna Bar and earned 
approximately $100.00 to $125.00 per month. However, the bar 
closed shortly after the trial and Mrs. Coffer lost her job. 
(See Findings of Fact, #9, Record, p. 154.) 
10. The parties have been back in Court since their 
divorce, and were both found in contempt. The Court had to 
threaten both parties with a jail sentence in order to convince 
them to settle their problems. (Minute Entry, Record, p. 171.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Teamster's Pension Fund was an asset which accrued, 
in part, during the course of the parties' marriage, and 
therefore, is subject to division as marital property. 
2. In accordance with Rayburn v. Rayburn, Utah App., 738 
P.2d 238 (1987) and Marchant v. Marchant, Utah App., 743 P.2d 199 
(1987), Mr. Coffer should cash out Mrs. Coffer's share of the 
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retirement fund, or arrange for direct payment of her share by 
the fund itself, in order to avoid long lasting financial 
entanglement of the parties. 
3. The Court's alimony award was justified under the 
standards set by this Court in Rasband v. Rasband, Utah App., 752 
P.2d 1331 (1988). 
4. Based on the parties1 ages, Mr. Coffer's health and 
Mrs. Coffer's inability to support herself, the award of a life 
insurance policy as alimony was not an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IS DEFENDANT'S PENSION FUND MARITAL PROPERTY? 
The Court should divide all the assets accumulated during a 
marriage on an equitable basis. The Court considers all assets 
of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
from whatever source derived, including retirement and pension 
rights. An asset is subject to distribution if to the extent 
that is accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. Woodard 
v. Woodard, Utah, 656 P.2d 431 (1982). 
"(T)he Utah Supreme Court has stated that whether retirement 
benefits are subject to distribution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presently use or control the benefits or on whether 
the resource can be given a present dollar value. 'The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued 
in whole or in part during the marriage.'" Greene v. Greene, 
Utah App., 751 P.2d 827 at 831 (1988). (Quoting Bailey v. 
Bailey, Utah App., 745 P.2d 830 at 831 (1987) and Woodard v. 
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Woodard, 656 P.2d at 433.) 
None of the cases cited by Mr. Coffer in his brief on this 
point are Utah cases and Mrs. Coffer would assert that Utah law 
on this point is clear. In Griggs v. Griggs, 107 Idaho 123, 686 
P.2d 68 (1984), (a case cited by Defendant) the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that retirement benefits are community property to the 
extent they accrued during the marriage. However, disability 
benefits are separate property to the extent they take the place 
of lost or impaired earning power, and compared these benefits to 
a Workmanfs Compensation award. While not a Utah case, this 
standard does not seem to differ greatly from Utah cases, except 
that Idaho is a community property state and Utah is not. 
In this case, Mr. Coffer's retirement was accrued, in part, 
during the course of his marriage to Mrs. Coffer. The amount he 
is entitled to receive was calculated on his length of employment 
or "units of service", i.e., his membership since 1958 with the 
Teamster's. (See Addendum and Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".) It 
was not based on his salary at the time Mr. Coffer retired, nor 
was it meant to compensate him for lost earnings or lost earning 
power during the two (2) years he would have otherwise worked 
before retiring. Had Mr. Coffer been able to work until 65, he 
would have received money from the very same source, but it would 
have been a larger sum as he would have had more "units of 
service". (See Trial Transcript, p. 75, Record, p. 249, lines 3-
10. ) 
Mr. Coffer is receiving his pension, albeit earlier than he 
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otherwise would have received it, absent his disability. He is 
not receiving anything extra or different because of his 
disability. It accrued, in part, during the parties1 marriage 
and should be treated as marital property. 
POINT II, SHOULD MR. COFFER BE REQUIRED TO CASH OUT MRS. 
COFFER'S SHARE OF THE PENSION? 
Mr. Coffer argues that he lacks the financial resources to 
cash out Mrs. Coffer's interest in his pension plan, and that the 
value established by the Court would be pure speculation, 
especially based on his health. 
This argument was never advanced at trial by Mr. Coffer, 
even though Mrs. Coffer clearly argued for a cash out in her pre-
trial memorandum submitted over one month before the trial, (See 
Record, p. 60), nor did Mr. Coffer challenge any of Mrs. Coffer's 
figures placing a value on his pension although they also were 
submitted over one (1) month before the trial. (See Record, p. 
71.) Mrs. Coffer would urge the Court should not consider these 
arguments for the first time on appeal, as Mr. Coffer had ample 
opportunity to raise any argument he might have had on this issue 
at or before trial, but failed to do so. 
This argument is particularly ironic in that Mr. Coffer 
argues in his brief on appeal that the property settlement 
provides Mrs. Coffer with the means to adequately support 
herself. Yet Mr. Coffer, who received property which is at least 
comparable in value, "lacks the financial resources to cash out 
any amount due to Respondent." (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) 
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Clearly, Mr. Coffer is inconsistent in his argument. He also 
received one-half (1/2) of a $10,000.00 Money Market Certificate, 
along with many items of personal property, a mobile home and 
approximately one (1) acre of ground, all of which is 
unencumbered. 
Respondent would urge that this particular part of the 
Court's Order is well justified, not only in case law — see 
Rayburn v. Rayburn, Utah App., 738 P.2d 238 (1987), and Marchant 
v. Marchant, Utah App., 743 P.2d 199 (1987), but by the facts of 
this case as demonstrated in the Order To Show Cause hearing held 
on July 5, 1988. It is clear from the Minute Entry (Record, p. 
171), that these parties are very hostile toward each other, and 
find it difficult to cooperate with each other on even the 
smallest of matters. As in Rayburn, the cash out requirement 
would avoid "further court hearings and . . . future animosity 
between the parties." Rayburn at 241-242. This situation seems 
to justify as little contact on as few matters as possible 
between the parties. 
POINT III. IS THE COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD JUSTIFIED? 
An award of spousal support will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a showing of clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
Rasband v. Rasband, Utah App., 752 P.2d 1331 (1988) and Paffel v. 
Paffel, Utah, 732 P.2d 96 (1986). 
"An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize 
the parties' respective post-divorce living standards and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of 
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living enjoyed during the marriage. The Utah Supreme Court has 
articulated three factors that must be considered by the trial 
court in determining a reasonable alimony award: (1) the 
financial conditions and needs of the requesting spouse; (2) the 
ability of the requesting spouse to produce a sufficient income 
for himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the other spouse 
to provide support." (citations omitted.) Rasband at 1333. 
In this case, the parties had been married for eighteen (18) 
years and were 57 and 63 at the time of trial. Mr. Coffer had 
contributed the income upon which the parties had lived on during 
the marriage. At the time of the separation, Mr. Cofferfs 
pension and social security provided the parties1 income. Mrs. 
Coffer had no job skills, although she was able to find part-
time work as a waitress for a maximum of $125.00 per month. The 
alimony award was less than one-half (1/2) of Mr. Coffer's income 
from social security. The pension was divided between the 
parties by way of the property division. 
It seems obvious that Mrs. Coffer's financial condition and 
needs justify alimony. She lost the only job she had had in 18 
years, had no job skills, no job prospects and is 57 years of age 
with only a high school diploma. This factual situation is 
similar to that in Jones v. Jones, Utah, 700 P.2d 1072 (1985), 
and Paffel v. Paffel, Utah, 732 P.2d 96 (1986). The Court's 
finding that Mrs. Coffer was unable to produce an income or 
support herself was justified. 
Mr. Coffer suggests that Mrs. Coffer is not in need of 
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support based on the property award. However, none of the assets 
awarded to Mrs. Coffer are income producing. If she sold her 
home or car, she would be without a home or transportation in a 
rural area. At best, this suggestion would only provide a 
temporary, one-time solution to the ongoing needs of Mrs. Coffer. 
Mr. Coffer, while not enjoying a hugh income, enjoys the 
only income the parties have. Even with the alimony award and 
property division, his standard of living will be nearer that 
enjoyed during the marriage than will Mrs. Coffer's. 
Mr. Coffer's argument that Mrs. Coffer should rehabilitate 
herself and become self-supporting is somewhat bizarre based on 
her age, area of residence (the small, remote rural town of Hanna 
in Duchesne County, which has one of the highest unemployment 
rates in Utah), and the fact that she has not worked in any of 
the jobs cited by Mr. Coffer since she was married to Mr. Coffer 
in 1970, and Mr. Coffer refused to let her work during the 
marriage. (Transcript, p. 24, Record, p. 24.) 
Mr. Coffer's argument for rehabilation is based on two (2) 
cases from Washington. Again, Mrs. Coffer would assert that Utah 
law on this point is clear. However, these cases are 
inapplicable in that Washington does not use the same standards 
for determining alimony in that they clearly reject the Utah 
standard of maintaining the parties at a level as close as 
possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
See Morgan v. Morgan, Wash., 369 P.2d 516 at 519 (1962). 
Mr. Coffer also argues that because his Teamster's pension 
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monthly payment drops in July, 1989, Mrs. Coffer's alimony award 
should decrease proportionately. But, the pension was designated 
and divided as property. Mrs. Coffer received 26.5% of Mr. 
Coffer's pension. The $200.00 alimony award is less than one-
half (1/2) of Mr. Coffer's social security income of $507.00 per 
month. Clearly, a property award which gives Mrs. Coffer 
slightly more than one-fourth (1/4) of one income source, and an 
alimony award of less than one-half (1/2) of the other, is not an 
abuse of discretion, especially in view of the goal of equalizing 
the parties' respective post-divorce standards of living. 
POINT IV. IS IT APPROPRIATE TO ORDER MR. COFFER TO MAINTAIN A 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY WITH MRS. COFFER AS BENEFICIARY, 
AS ALIMONY? 
The Court's order that Mr. Coffer was to maintain Mrs. 
Coffer as beneficiary on his $5,000.00 life insurance policy is 
based on Mr. Coffer's health, i.e., two (2) heart attacks, open 
heart bypass surgery, and Mrs. Coffer's inability to support 
herself. At Mr. Coffer's death, Mrs. Coffer could easily be 
unable to support herself without the alimony payment and the 
Court's order anticipates that fact. 
Mr. Coffer's argument that the Court's order "interferes 
with his right to contract freely, or at least adds restrictions 
to a life insurance contract not originally contemplated by the 
parties" ignores the fact that most divorce decrees change or 
restrict the parties' duties and obligations under contracts in 
ways that were not originally contemplated by the parties. 
Mrs, Coffer would assert that based on the facts, Mr. Coffer 
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las not met his burden of showing that the alimony award to Mrs. 
Coffer was a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion" by the 
trial court, and therefore, the award should not be disturbed on 
appeal. Rasband v. Rasband, Utah App., 752 P.2d 1331 (1988), and 
Paffel v. Paffel, Utah, 732 P.2d 96 (1986). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's Order in this case is justified by the facts and 
by the law of the State of Utah. Therefore, Mrs. Coffer would 
argue that the Trial Court's decision should be sustained and Mr. 
Coffer's appeal should be dismissed in toto. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 1989. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 16th day of February, 1989, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT,postage prepaid, to Dixon D. Hindley, D. ARON STANTON 
& ASSOCIATES, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 2035 East 3300 
South, Suite 314, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, by depositing the 
same in the United States Post Office at Roosevelt, Utah. 
Att >rnev 
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